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Turkey has a large informal economy and has been hit by severe financial crises causing a 
devastating impact on its economy. The main objective of this paper is to analyse the impact 
of financial crises on the informal economy in Turkey. We distinguish between four types of 
financial crises that make up or aggregate financial crises: internal, external, currency and 
banking crises. Using vector autoregression (VARX) in the presence of two key variables (the 
financial crisis and the informal economy), we conduct annual time series analysis from 1980 
to 2011 and estimate the response of the informal economy to each type of crisis. To our 
knowledge, this is the first empirical study to examine the effects of financial crises on the 
informal economy in the context of the Turkish economy. The results show that each type of 
crisis produces a significantly positive response to the informal economy. In particular, the 
findings of this paper show that financial crises tend to have a permanent positive effect on the 
informal economy, suggesting that the informal economy is an important buffer, which tends 
to expand in times of crises in Turkey. 
 
Keywords: Informal Economy, Financial Crises, Turkey, Currency Crisis, Banking 
Crisis, Development 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
Financial crises hurt economies around the world, either directly or indirectly, through various 
transmission channels. Even though effects vary across countries, financial crises have a 
negative impact on the economy, resulting in sharp declines in growth and employment. The 
global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007, which has been considered the worst since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s affected countries with strong as well as weak economies. The 
emergence of GFC and its painful effects has increased the interest of economists and 
policymakers to understand the financial crisis and its effects. Much of the current literature on 
financial crises has paid attention to the effects on the official economy (see, for example, Cerra 
and Saxena 2008, Laeven and Valencia 2010, Qerimi and Sergi 2017). However, very little is 
known about the effects on the informal economy (e.g. Colombo et al., 2016). The effect of 
financial crises on the informal economy has so far remained under-examined. One of the 
reasons for the absence of studies on this issue might be because of the complexity of both 
subjects. It is important to note that the informal economy is not easily tractable.  
 
Turkey has been hit harder by financial crises and has fallen into a significant recession since 
the 1980s. Despite the higher awareness of the informal economy, the informal economy is still 
a non-tackled issue in Turkey. There has been no fruitful attention given to understanding the 
impact of financial crises on the informal economy. Therefore, measuring the impact of 
financial crises on the informal economy represents an important aspect of economic analysis 
to understand the functions of the Turkish economy. Furthermore, it is worth examining the 
impact for policy reasons. Given that the informal economy is tremendous in developing 
countries, the importance of understanding the impact of financial crises cannot be 
underestimated. The aim of this paper is not to estimate the impact of financial crises on the 
official economy of Turkey. Rather, the main objective is to analyse the impact of financial 
crises on the informal economy applying VARX model. This paper seeks to address this gap 
in the existing literature. This makes it possible to then suggest some tentative propositions 
about the possible impact of the informal economy on growth and draw a clear conclusion 
about the informal and official economy’s relationship in Turkey. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 3 introduces data and methodology. The results and their interpretations are presented 
in section 4 and the last section concludes. 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
A considerable amount of literature has been published on financial crises and their impacts on 
the official economy (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2000,  Barro 2001,  Hutchison and Noy 2002, 
Hutchison and Noy 2005, Gupta et al., 2007,  Dell’ Arricia et al., 2008, Cerra and Saxena 2008, 
Knotek and Terry 2009, Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, Kroeger and Meier 2011, Furceri and 
Zdzienneicka 2011, Choudray et al., 2012,  Babecky et al., 2012, Fukuda 2012, Verdugo et al., 
2012, Qerimi and Sergi 2017). Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) argued three important 
characteristics of financial crises: a deep collapse in the asset market, a large decline in output 
and employment, as well as a drastic increase in government debt. In this respect, the authors 
examined five important developed economy crises and a number of emerging market 
economies crises.  These are 1977 Spain, 1987 Norway, 1991 Finland and Sweden, 1992 Japan, 
1997 Asian, 1998 Colombia and 2001 Argentina crises. They show that financial crises are 
associated with the economic downturn and a large decline in output. Regressing 5-year 
 average output growth on several control variables such as openness, per capita GDP for the 
period of 1965 and 2000, Barro (2001) showed the currency crisis is associated with a 1.3% 
decrease in average output growth but banking crisis is found to be 0.6% decrease in average 
output growth. Output effects of currency crises are analysed by Hutchison and Noy (2002) 
using the panel data set for the period 1975-1997 in 24 emerging market economies. They show 
that currency crises are associated with significant declines in output by about 5-8% over a 2-
year period. By contrast, Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2000) focussed on the output costs associated 
with banking crises. They perform a cross-section of 36 banking crises and found that banking 
crises are associated with large declines in output growth of about 4%. Focusing on the twin 
crises phenomenon, Hutchison and Noy (2005) investigated output effects of both banking and 
currency crises and their joint effects on the real economies of 24 emerging countries, including 
Argentina, Brazil, Turkey, Thailand, South Africa and Mexico. They found that each type of 
crisis severely damaged the economy. However, banking crises are found to be costlier, 
normally with 8%-10% decline in output growth over 2-4-year periods, followed by currency 
crises with 5%-8% declines in output growth for the same period. They showed that the 
cumulative loss of both crises is very large, 13%-18% of output. Gupta et al., (2007) examined 
the behaviour of output in times of currency crises in 91 developing countries (17 Asian, 42 
African, 20 Latin American and 12 Central and Eastern European and Middle East countries). 
The results show almost 60% of currency crises have a contractionary effect on output. Using 
two different methodologies, the vector error correction model (VECM) and the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) techniques, Fukuda (2012) examined the relationship between 
financial crises and economic growth in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and India and 
show that financial crises have had a negative impact in all these countries. In the same way, 
using ARDL technique, Furceri and Zdzienneicka (2011) looked at and compared the impact 
of financial crises on output in eleven transition countries (CEECs) and advanced European 
economies (EU-15). They found that crises have a significant negative impact on output by 
lowering it 17% in CEECs. Unlike CEECs, financial crises lower output by 2% in EU-15. On 
an impact of output loss of financial crises in developed countries, Babecky et al., (2012) is 
probably the best-known study on the financial crisis in the context of developed countries. 
They examined the effect of several types of crisis including currency crisis, banking crisis and 
debt crisis on economic activities in terms of output loss for a panel of 40 developed countries 
from 1970 to 2010. The mean cumulative loss is about 25%, 15% and 4% following the 
banking, currency and debt crises respectively. 
 
Kroeger and Meier (2011) examined the labour market impact of GFC in a transition country, 
Tajikistan. Applying multinomial probit regression from 2007 and 2009, they found an 
increased probability of being unemployed, inactive and involved in unpaid works in times of 
crises. Applying vector autoregression (VAR) model, Verdugo et al., (2012) also measured the 
impact financial crises on unemployment using a panel of 97 countries from 1980 to 2008 and 
found a significant and long-lasting increase in the unemployment rate after the financial crisis. 
Focusing on youth unemployment rate in a large panel of countries (70) for the 1980-2005, 
Choudray et al., (2012) analysed the impact of financial crises on the youth unemployment rate 
and show that financial crises cause a substantial increase in youth unemployment. Knotek and 
Terry (2009) examined the relationship between the banking crisis and unemployment from 
1960 to 2007 in 33 high-income countries. Based on the vector autoregression analysis (VAR), 
they find that the unemployment rate increased by almost 2.5 percentage points over the four 
years. In addition, if banking crises coincide with the recession, the impact on unemployment 
is even found to be worse which increases 3.5 percentage points over the four years. The recent 
paper by Qerimi and Sergi (2017) looked at the impact of GFC and eurozone crises on 
 employment in South East Europe. The authors suggest both GFC and eurozone crises 
significantly contributed to the high level of unemployment in the area. 
 
Focusing on the impact of financial crises on the informal economy, theoretical and empirical 
research is not extensive. In their studies, Roca et al., (2001) and Elgin (2012) emphasised the 
role of the informal economy as countercyclical in times of crises. Elgin (2012) investigated 
the relationship between the business cycle and the size of the informal economy in 152 
countries using panel regression and show that the size of the informal economy tends to 
decrease in booms but increase in busts. Schneider and Buehn (2012) estimated the size of the 
informal economy in highly developed 39 OECD countries from 1999 to 2010. The authors’ 
calculation shows an increase in the size of the informal economy and they argue that the 
increase in the size is caused by the GFC. There are only two main studies that directly focus 
on the impact of financial crises on the informal economy. Colombo et al. (2012) employed 
total electricity approach for a panel of 120 countries from 1980 to 2005 using an 
autoregressive model. The results show that financial crises have a strong negative impact on 
official output. By contrast, they found a positive response of the informal economy to financial 
crises. The effect of the banking crisis is found to be much stronger than the currency crisis on 
the informal economy. Like their earlier study, Colombo et al., (2016) investigated the effect 
of the banking crises on the informal economy. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
model, they found the positive response of the informal economy to banking crises. 
 
Turkey is a growing and dynamic free market economy. In Turkey, the growth rate has been 
erratic, and the country has been struggling with employment problems. As indicated by 
Nathason and Brand (2011), Turkey has the potential to be one of the largest economies in 
Europe, but economic growth has been subject to many obstacles. Inefficient macroeconomic 
policies, legal, structural and political disorders have led Turkey to be hit harder by currency, 
banking, debt, twin crises both domestic and global. For example, between 1997 and 1999, 
both Asian and Russian crises and two disastrous earthquakes, were devastating, the effect of 
these crises were immediately felt in the Turkish economy. Similarly, 2000-2001 currency and 
banking crises crippled the Turkish economy. Regarding the 2000-2001 crises, Temiz and 
Gokmen (2009) argued that Turkey experienced a huge decrease in capital flows, a substantial 
increase in interest rates, sharp depreciation of Turkish lira by 50% and a sharp increase in 
unemployment. In the same vein, Ozturk and Aras (2011) claimed that 2000-2001 crises were 
destructive, and the Turkish economy contracted by 9.4% with a dramatic increase in inflation 
(70%). Considering Global financial crises (GFC) started as US property market crash and 
rapidly spread across countries, Aras (2010) argued that Turkey was negatively affected by the 
GFC by experiencing large contractions in terms of GDP. The informal economy is one of the 
major characteristics of the Turkish economy. Several studies have documented its persistence 
and pervasiveness (e.g. Ercan 2011, Eurofound 2013, Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro 2010, 
Simsek 2014, World Bank 2010). The informal economy is part of many people’s daily routine. 
The ILO (2012) reported that informality among young people in Turkey is signiﬁcant (58.8%) 
compared with adults (43.8%). The report states that it is because the official economy is unable 
to create suﬃcient formal employment opportunities. Simsek (2014), A Former Deputy Prime 
Minister, claimed the informal economy is a key issue to tackle in Turkey because it slows the 
economic growth, production, cause signiﬁcant loss of tax revenue and creates wage inequality. 
It is also important to note that Turkey has a higher degree of informality in comparison with 
European counties. For instance, the size of the informal economy is larger in Turkey than in 
the EU-27 countries (Buehn and Schneider, 2012). The evidence presented suggests that the 
informal economy and financial crises play a very important role in Turkey’s economy and has 
important economic and social functions.  
  Data and Methodology 
 
(a) Data 
 
The data used in the estimation process covers the period between 1980-2011 and were 
collected from three main sources: (i) Real GDP and terms of trade (TOT) data are obtained 
from World Bank Development Indicators (WDI). TOT is defined as the ratio of price deflator 
for imports and the price deflator for exports. (ii) The data on the informal economy was 
obtained from the authors’ estimation of the size of the informal economy. The dependent 
variable is the size of the informal economy. This is estimated using the MIMIC (Multiple 
Indicators and Multiple Causes) approach and the electricity consumption method for each 
model.1  (iii) The financial crises dates are taken from Reinhart and Rogoff database (RR).2 RR 
database consists of crisis dates (onset of a crisis) covering a wide range of counties (70 
countries). Each crisis is measured by a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 when the 
country is considered to be in a corresponding crisis and 0 when no crisis occurred. The analysis 
is based on the data from 1980 onwards and covers currency crises, banking crises and 
sovereign debt crises.  
 
As this paper’s primary aim is to measure the aggregate impact of financial crises on the 
informal economy, a new variable called “financial crises” is created. The variable is compiled 
from RR database banking crises, currency crises and sovereign debt crises. It does not 
distinguish between internal and external crises and it represents a situation whereby a country 
experiences either a specific type of crisis or twin or triple crises. The financial crises variable 
is measured by a dummy variable and takes value 1 when the country is judged to experience 
corresponding crises and 0 when no crisis occurred. Second, compiling the data from the RR 
database, we distinguish between internal and external crises and examine the effects of 
internal and external crises on the informal economy separately. The variable “internal crises” 
consists of a currency crisis, banking crisis, debt crisis or twin crises that occurred domestically 
and the variable “external crises” consist of crises either currency crisis, banking crisis, debt 
crisis or twin crises that are foreign in origin. Both internal and external crises are also 
measured by dummy variables and take on value 1 in times of crises and 0 in other periods. 
Third, having considered that Turkey has faced many currencies and banking crises, the effect 
of currency and banking crises are examined. For this analysis, banking and currency crises 
dates are obtained from the RR database. As before, both crises are expressed as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when a country is in crisis and 0 otherwise. As a result, Turkey has 
experienced 25 financial crises at the aggregate level.  23 currency crises, 7 banking crises, 2 
external debt crises, 1 internal debt crisis, 20 internal crises including currency, banking and 
domestic debt crises, and 7 external crises including currency, banking, twin and external debt 
crises over the past 30 years. It is important to emphasise that the use of dummy variables in 
the VARX is not a new application. See, for example, Fomby et al., (2013) in Journal of 
Applied Econometrics, who use dummy variables for disaster-related events to examine the 
effects of natural disasters on growth. 
 
 
                                                          
1 We also estimate the size of the informal economy based on electricity consumption method. This second 
source is used as the dependent variable for robustness check. Results of each method of measurement are 
available upon request. 
2 Appendix Table A1 provides a summary of the definition of crises by http://www.reinhartandrogoff.com/.  For 
more information on financial crises, dates and definition see also Reinhart (2010) and Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011). 
 (b) Econometric methodology 
 
The econometric analysis is based on the vector autoregression model in the presence of both 
endogenous and exogenous variables (VARX) proposed by Pesaran et al., (2000) and Pesaran 
and Pesaran (2009). This model allows for the study of the dynamics of each type of financial 
crises and their effects on the informal economy. Following Pesaran and Pesaran (2009), given 
a set of m endogenous and n exogenous variables, the general framework of the VARX model 
can be described in the following form: 
 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑦𝑡 − Π𝑦𝑧𝑡−1 + ∑ Γ𝑖𝑦∆z𝑡−𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1 + Ψ𝑦𝑤𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡     (1) 
                                   
Where, 𝑧𝑡 = (𝑦𝑡
′𝑥𝑡
′)′,  𝑦𝑡 is a vector of endogenous variables, 𝑥𝑡 is a vector of exogenous 
variables. 𝑎0 and 𝑎1𝑦 represent the intercept and the trend coefficients respectively. 𝑤𝑡  is 
vector of exogenous I(0) or deterministic variables. Π𝑦 is the matrices of long-run coefficients 
and Γ𝑖𝑦 is the matrices of short run coefficients.  Ψ𝑦 denotes the coefficient matrix of I(0) 
exogenous or deterministic variables. Π stands for a cointegrating relationship and has a 
deficient rank, r, which represent a number of cointegrating vectors. If Π is equal to zero (Π =
0), this implies that there is no cointegration. However, if  Π  is not equal to zero (Π ≠ 0), this 
implies that there is a cointegrating relationship. When there is an r cointegrating relationship,  
Π can be expressed as below: 
 
Π = 𝛼𝛽′                                                                                                                (2) 
 
Where  𝛼 and 𝛽 are 𝑚 𝑥 𝑟 full rank matrices. 𝛼 is an error correction coefficient and 𝛽 
corresponds to cointegrating coefficients. Localisation of intercept and trends are important in 
cointegration analysis. In empirical work, since it is difficult to know whether there are linear 
trends in variables or whether they cancel themselves in cointegration relations, Pesaran et al., 
(1997; 2000) differentiate five different cases. Case I (no intercept and no trends, 𝑎0= 𝑎1=0), 
Case II (restricted intercept and no trend, 𝑎1=0 and 𝑎0= Π𝑦𝜇𝑦), Case III (unrestricted intercept 
and no trend, 𝑎1=0 and 𝑎0 ≠0), Case IV (unrestricted intercept and restricted trend, 𝑎0≠0 and 
𝑎1=Π𝑦𝛾𝑦) and Case V (unrestricted intercept and trend, 𝑎0≠0 and 𝑎1≠0).  It should be noted 
that Pesaran et al., (2000) argue that Case II is likely to be particularly relevant in practice and 
preferable to the corresponding unrestricted cases. Therefore, Case II was adopted for this 
study.  
 
(c) Model specification 
 
Equation (1) is the cointegration VARX model we adopted in our estimation. This econometric 
approach above is applied to three different models. The first (Model I) considers the financial 
crisis at an aggregate level including currency, banking, debt, the classic “twin” crises, internal 
and external crises, and attempts to test the overall impacts of financial crises on the informal 
economy. In this model,  𝑦𝑡 denotes a vector of endogenous variables containing real GDP and 
the informal economy. TOT is included in the model as an I(0) exogenous variable, which 
allows a determination of how global factors affect domestic economic growth and other 
endogenous variables (Fomby et al., 2013). Financial crisis is the dummy variable 
(deterministic variable). 
 
In the second model (Model II), the distinction is made between the effects of internal 
(domestic) and external (global) crises in order to carry out an empirical analysis of the 
 sensitivity of the informal economy to each type of crisis separately. To set up the VARX 
model, as before, two endogenous variables (real GDP and the informal economy) are included 
in the model and terms of trade is considered as exogenous I(0) variable. Internal and external 
dummies are dummy variables we wish to include to investigate their impacts on the informal 
economy. Dummy variables are included in the VARX as deterministic variables. The RR 
database shows that Turkey has been mainly hit by currency (23) and banking (7) crises since 
the 1980s. Thus, we finally consider the currency and banking crises and attempts to identify 
the effect of these crises on the informal economy. We specify, therefore, the model (Model 
III) including currency and banking crises. This model contains the following variables: the 
informal economy and the real GDP as endogenous variables and terms of trade as an 
exogenous I(0) variable. Again, currency and banking crises dummies are included in the 
model as deterministic variables. 
 
The estimation results are conducted by Microfit 5, which allows separating between the 
endogenous, exogenous and deterministic variables. The set of endogenous variables are 
followed by an exogenous variable (TOT) which is then followed by deterministic variables 
(dummies).3 Prior to the implementation of our cointegrated VARX model, we check the 
stationarity of variables. In order to check whether variables are stationary, three unit root tests 
are used: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP) and Dickey-Fuller 
Generalised Least Squared (DF-GLS) tests. Unit root test results are summarised in Table 1. 
As shown all three tests at level indicate that the informal economy (IE) (IE using the MIMIC 
model approach and IE2 using the electricity consumption method) and the real GDP are not 
stationary. The unit root tests of TOT variable shows the presence of stationary in level I(0). 
The null hypothesis of a unit root for TOT variable is rejected at 1% significance level. 
 
Table 1: Unit root tests  
ADF test PP test DF-GLS test 
 
Var. In 
Level 
In 
diff. 
In 
Level 
In 
diff. 
In 
Level 
In 
diff. 
Con. 
        
GDP -2.924 -5.834*** -2.958 -6.803*** -2.892 -6.013*** I(1) 
IE -2.736 -5.590*** -2.803 -6.378*** -2.756 -5.740*** I(1) 
IE2 -1.677 -6.077*** -1.636 -6.847*** -1.939 -6.220*** I(1) 
TOT -5.440*** - -5.548*** - -3.795*** - I(0) 
(i) Source: Author. (ii) Note: (a) all test takes unit root as null hypotheses and asterisk *** 
denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% significance level, (b) all test are done with the 
trend and intercept, (c) for ADF test, Akaike information criterion is used to select the lag 
length and the maximum lag length is set to be 2. For the PP test, Newey-West is used to 
select a bandwidth. 
 
It is also important to determine the lag structure of the VARX model before proceeding to the 
estimation of models. Given that we have annual data we set the maximum lag number to 2 
and use two well-known criteria, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian 
Information Criterion (SBC) to determine the appropriate lag order. Both information criteria 
suggest one lag for each model.4  
 
                                                          
3 For further information, see Pesaran and Pesaran (2009). For each model, endogenous variables are followed 
by exogenous and deterministic dummy variables.  
4 All tests are obtained using Microfit 5.0. For further technical details see Pesaran and Pesaran (2009). 
 Table 2: Cointegration test statistics for models  
H0 H1 Test statistics 5% cv 10% cv  
                                                     Model I 
  
     
 
(I) Maximal eigenvalue statistics 
  
  
r=0 r=1 37.600 25.557 23.217  
r<=1 r=2 10.861 18.078 15.424 
(II) Trace statistics 
  
  
r=0 r=1 50.915 38.353 35.476  
r=1 r=2 13.315 21.988 19.467 
H0 H1 Test statistics 5% cv 10% cv  
                                                     Model II 
  
 
(I) Maximal eigenvalue statistics 
  
  
r=0 r=1 49.996 30.083 26.943  
r<=1 r=2 12.190 22.240 19.704 
(II) Trace statistics 
  
  
r=0 r=1 65.274 48.523 44.665  
r=1 r=2 15.278 29.354 25.806  
H0 H1 Test statistics 5% cv 10% cv  
                                                    Model III 
  
 
(I) Maximal eigenvalue statistics 
  
  
r=0 r=1 36.402 32.165 29.645  
r<=1 r=2 19.540 25.557 23.217 
(II) Trace statistics 
  
 
 
r=0 r=1 69.198 59.829 55.752  
r=1 r=2 32.796 38.353 35.476 
Source: Author.  
 
After determining the appropriate lag order, cointegration test is performed. Since Johansen 
cointegration method involves estimation of more than one equation, allows the possibility of 
more than one cointegrating relations and has an advantage in the case of small samples, in 
order to test cointegration, the Johansen method is used in this study.5 It should be noted that 
TOT is included as an unrestricted deterministic I(0) exogenous variable in each model. Thus, 
cointegration is tested only on non-stationary variables.6 The test statistics are computed using 
30 observations from 1980 to 2011. The 5% and 10% critical values are computed by stochastic 
simulations using 1000 replications. The cointegration test results for Model I, Model II and 
Model III are summarised in Table 2. The cointegration test clearly rejects the null position of 
no cointegration at the 5% level when using the maximum eigenvalue test. Similar results are 
obtained when using the trace test. Similar to Model I, the maximum eigenvalue and trace 
statistics demonstrate that there exists one cointegrating relation. For Model III, the maximum 
eigenvalue test rejects the null hypothesis r=0 against r=1 at the 5% level. Turning to the trace 
test, this gives equivalent results. Overall, it appears that both maximum eigenvalue and trace 
tests suggest the presence of one cointegration relation at the 5% level for baseline models. The 
test results are supportive of the existence of one long-run relationship, which is between the 
informal economy and the real GDP. 
                                                          
5  For further discussion of Johansen cointegration test and its advantages, see Johansen (1988; 1991).  
6 See Pesaran and Pesaran (2009) for technical details.  
 Results 
 
(a) Impulse responses for baseline models 
 
To investigate the effects of financial crises, the mean responses are used. Mean responses trace 
the effect of shocks on current and future values of each variable in the VARX system and 
provide useful information on the persistence of shocks for a long-time horizon. Analysis of 
impulse responses also enables researchers to investigate the dynamic relationship of variables 
over time (Pesaran and Pesaran, 2009). Given the model specification, each VARX model is 
used to simulate the effects of financial crises on the selected variables in the system, which 
provides a meaningful interpretation of the initial impact of the financial crisis shocks.7 The 
following figures and tables show the mean responses of the informal economy to each type of 
financial crisis for the first 10 years between 1980 and 2011 (year 0 denotes the year that 
financial crises occurred). Since the objective of this paper is to trace the dynamic path of 
adjustment in the aftermath of crises, the mean response of the informal economy to a given 
crisis is the most relevant analysis. The significance of results, evaluated by 90%, 95% and 
99% confidence intervals derived from Monte Carlo simulations, are presented in Tables 3 to 
5, for the informal economy. In addition, mean responses of the informal economy for each 
financial crisis are illustrated by graphs at 95% confidence interval (CI) that give a visual 
representation of responses (Figures 1-3). In each graph, points above zero show positive 
responses and points below zero show negative responses. 
 
The impact of an aggregate financial crisis on the informal economy (model I) 
 
The mean responses of the informal economy to a financial crisis and graphical representations 
of the mean responses corresponding to a confidence interval of 95% are shown in Table 3 and 
Figure 1 respectively. The results show that the mean response of the informal economy to 
financial crises is significantly positive and very strong in terms of statistical significance, 
except for year 0. The mean response of the informal economy to the financial crisis is positive 
in the year of the event, but it is not significant. The effect becomes significant in the first year 
at a 1% level, and, as illustrated in Figure 1, it increases gradually following the financial crises, 
and tends to be highly significant after the crisis. The response of the informal economy 
increases from 4% (first-year impact) to 5.6% and 6.7% in the second and third years 
respectively, and in subsequent years, it continues to increase slightly. Estimated results clearly 
indicate that there is no sign of drop-in responses of the informal economy, but a build-up of 
positive responses for the long-term horizon. These results, in turn, suggest that financial crises 
have a long-lasting positive effect on the informal economy.  
 
One explanation could be that financial crises are followed by deep economic contractions due 
to large declines in demand. Therefore, the positive response of the informal economy could 
be explained by an economic downturn due to decreases in real GDP. Consistent with the 
existing literature (e.g. Aras 2010, Yendi et al., 2012), financial crises are found to be harmful 
to real GDP. The results show that the mean response of the real GDP to financial crises is 
deeply negative on the year of the event, and no significant recovery occurs in the following 
years (see Figure A1, Graph (a) in Appendix). Hence, these findings support the notion that 
financial crises tend to disrupt economic activities, causing unemployment to rise, seeing 
decreases in family income and forcing people to look for extra income. Furthermore, declines 
in GDP may also negatively impact the government’s ability to create official jobs, due to 
                                                          
7 For further discussion see Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Lee and Pesaran (1999). 
 deterioration within institutional and financial settings. It is worth noting that in the case of 
Turkey, demographic pressures may also aggravate the situation. The Turkish population and 
the working age population grow very fast. Hence, the Turkish labour force is growing. 
However, job creation in the official economy has a limited ability to accommodate the 
growing labour force (Ercan, 2011). This, in turn, may induce people to look for jobs in the 
informal economy. 
 
Table 3: Mean response of the informal economy to financial crises 
Years  Financial crises  
Year 0 (instantaneous response) 0.009 
Year 1     0.039*** 
Year 2     0.056*** 
Year 3     0.067*** 
Year 4     0.073*** 
Year 5     0.077*** 
Year 6     0.080*** 
Year 7     0.081*** 
Year 8     0.082*** 
Year 9     0.083*** 
Year 10     0.084*** 
(i) Source: Author.  (ii) Notes: (a) *** indicates 1% significance level; (b) 1000 replications 
were used in bootstrap confidence interval of impulse responses. 
 
Figure 1: Mean response of the informal economy to financial crises 
 
(i) Source: Author. (ii) Note: the solid line represents the estimated IRFs and dotted lines 
represent 95%   confidence interval. 
The impact of internal and external crises on the informal economy (model II) 
 
In order to investigate the effects of internal and external crises separately, the financial crises 
are disaggregated into internal and external ones. The results of the mean responses are reported 
in Table 4 and illustrated in Figure 2. As column (a) of the Table and Figure 2 graphs (a) show, 
the mean responses of the informal economy to internal crises is positive and significant on the 
 year of the event at a 5% level. Internal crises produce a highly significant response to the 
informal economy in year 1 and in subsequent years. Specifically, the response of the informal 
economy increases by 3.5% in the 1st year to 5.6% in the 5th year and to 5.9% in the 10th year 
indicating its permanent positive effect on the informal economy. Similar to aggregate financial 
crises, there is no sign of a drop in the response of the informal economy, but a build-up of 
positive responses over the years. However, it should be noted that the mean response of the 
informal economy tends to stabilise 6 years later in years 7 and 8 after the crises at around 
5.8%. Then a slight increase was observed in the response of the informal economy 1 year later 
in year 9 at 5.9%, though the effect remains positive and significant, but does not tend to 
increase thereafter.  
 
Table 4: Mean response of the informal economy to external and internal crises 
Years  Internal crises (a)  External crises (b) 
Year 0 (instantaneous response)   0.012** 0.003 
Year 1    0.035***     0.028*** 
Year 2     0.045***     0.037*** 
Year 3     0.051***      0.044*** 
Year 4     0.054***      0.047*** 
Year 5     0.056***      0.049*** 
Year 6     0.057***      0.050*** 
Year 7     0.058***      0.051*** 
Year 8     0.058***      0.052*** 
Year 9     0.059***      0.052*** 
Year 10     0.059***      0.052*** 
(i) Source: Author.  (ii) Notes: (a) ** and ***indicate 5% and 1% significance level of financial 
crisis shocks respectively; (b) 1000 replications were used in the bootstrap confidence 
interval of impulse responses. 
Estimated results show that internal crises are inversely related to real GDP. The negative 
impact is also felt in the year of the internal crises. In subsequent years, the real GDP does not 
recover, which in turn may explain the increase in the response of the informal economy (see 
Figure A1, Graph (b) in Appendix). It might be argued that internal crises cause economic, 
social, financial and institutional insufficiency. Thus, the inadequacy of government and 
financial institutions leads to a shrinking pool of jobs available in the official economy and 
triggers the unemployment problem of Turkey. On the supply side, a person who cannot afford 
to be unemployed and looks for extra income accepts the jobs available in the informal 
economy. On the demand side, the financial crisis may also force employers to go underground 
and employ workers informally. Hence, these results suggest positive impacts on the informal 
economy as it serves as a cushion in times of crises. Furthermore, these results are also in line 
with the existing literature. For example, Ercan (2011) reports that informal employment rose 
by 2.3 points during the 2001 crisis and remained high in the following two years due to official 
job losses in Turkey. Given the country’s high population growth, rapid internal migration and 
chronic unemployment, the positive effects of internal crises on the informal economy are not 
surprising.  
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2: Mean response of the informal economy to internal and external crises 
   
(i) Source: Author. (ii) Note: the solid line represents the estimated IRF and dotted lines 
represent 95% confidence interval. 
(a)                                                                    (b) 
 
Turning now to the response of the informal economy to external financial crises as shown in 
column (b) of Table 4 and the Figure 2, graph (b) there is no significant response in the year of 
the external crisis, unlike internal crises. The results show that the informal economy is 
significantly affected by an external crisis, but with some delay: in year 1 after the crisis, a 
significant increase in the response of the informal economy continues to occur in the following 
years. The response of the informal economy rises from 2.8 % in the 1st year to 4.9% in the 5th 
year and reaches a peak response in the 10th year (5.2%).  Similar to internal financial crises, 
results exhibit significant and permanent effects on the informal economy due to external crises 
but in year 1 after the crises. Recent evidence also suggests that external crises can have a 
considerable influence on the informal economy in Turkey. For example, Yazir (2010) states 
that with the effect of the global financial crisis (GFC) on the Turkish economy, unemployment 
increased by 0.7% in 2008 and 3% by the end of 2009, and in turn, unregistered employment 
gained momentum and increased 0.4% by the end of 2009, adding 108,000 more people as 
participants in the informal economy. 
 
The impact of currency and banking crises on the informal economy (model III) 
 
Currency and banking crises’ effects are estimated separately to identify their different impacts 
on the informal economy. Regarding these two crises, the results on the mean response of the 
informal economy are presented in Table 5 and Figure 3. As reported in column (a) of the Table 
and portrayed in Figure 3 graph (a), a currency crisis appears to have a negative impact, but 
not a statistically significant impact on the informal economy in the same year as the crisis 
itself. A negative initial response within the informal economy can be explained by the fact 
that a currency crisis lowers the value of a currency and hence the purchasing power of 
individuals. Since the informal economy is essentially a cash economy, the initial response is 
negative. However, as explained, this negative effect is not statistically significant. The positive 
 and significant impact of a currency crisis is felt in year 1. The mean responses in the 
subsequent years remain positive and statistically significant and gradually increase from year 
1 to year 7. Although there is no sign of an increase in the response of the informal economy 
after 7 years, the impact remains positive and significant on the informal economy with an 
average of 4% for the investigated period. 
 
Table 5: Mean response of the informal economy to currency and banking crises 
Years  Currency crisis (a) Banking crisis (b) 
Year 0 (instantaneous response)              -0.005 0.019** 
Year 1 0.018*  0.035*** 
Year 2  0.029**  0.043*** 
Year 3  0.034**  0.047*** 
Year 4   0.037***  0.049*** 
Year 5   0.039***  0.050*** 
Year 6   0.040***  0.051*** 
Year 7   0.040***  0.051*** 
Year 8   0.041***      0.051***  
Year 9   0.041***  0.051*** 
Year 10   0.041***  0.051*** 
(i) Source: Author. (ii) Notes: (a) *  ** and ***indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level of 
financial crisis shocks respectively. (b) 1000 replications were used in bootstrap confidence 
interval of impulse responses. 
In contrast to currency crises, as shown in column (b) of Table 5 and Figure 3, graph (b), the 
positive and significant impacts of a banking crisis are felt in the year of the crisis. The effect 
remains statistically significant at 1% level for the following 10 years. Specifically, the mean 
response of the informal economy to a banking crisis is deeply positive from year 0 to year 10, 
but there is no increase in the response of the informal economy after 5 years of that crisis. The 
response of the informal economy remains constant and significant at 5.1%, indicating the 
presence of long-lasting effects of a banking crisis. In terms of banking crises, the response of 
the informal economy is found to be around 5% on average, which is higher than for currency 
crises. 
 
Turning to the currency crises vs. banking crises, the estimations show the informal economy 
is more likely to be affected by banking crises than currency crises in Turkey. The mean 
response of the informal economy to banking crises is stronger in terms of size than currency 
crises. In fact, banking crises have almost more than twice the positive impact in year 1 and 
are bigger in size over the next 10 years. The cumulative positive response of the informal 
economy to banking crises is about 50%, considerably higher than for currency crises (35.5%). 
However, both crises bring about a positive mean response for the informal economy in year 1 
and the following years, and their effects are long-lived. Regarding the difference between the 
effects of currency and banking crises, a recent paper by Oulton and Barriel (2013) indicates 
that banking crises are fundamentally different from another type of crises, i.e., currency crises. 
They find that banking crises have more severe and long-lasting effects on growth. In line with 
Oulton and Barrier (2013), our results also suggest the severity of banking crises from year 0 
to 10 on real GDP, which might be closely associated with stronger impacts of banking crises 
on the informal economy (see Figure A1, Graph (e) in Appendix). In addition, according to 
Colombo et al., (2012, 2016), different responses to different crises can be explained by 
 examining the role of the informal economy. They argue that the effect of currency crises 
(acting as inflation shocks) on the informal economy is constrained by inflation, which acts as 
a tax on cash holding and affects the informal economy more than the official economy since 
the informal economy is more cash intensive. In fact, the effects of banking crises, which are 
found to be stronger, reinforce this argument.  
 
Figure 3: Mean response of the informal economy to banking and currency crises 
  
(i) Source: Author. (ii) Note: the solid line represents the estimated IRF and dotted lines 
represent a 95% confidence interval.                                                                           
(a)                                                               (b) 
 
(b) Robustness check 
 
To check the robustness of results, the econometric approach we adopted, is re-estimated using 
the alternative measurement of the informal economy. Indeed, the informal economy is 
estimated using what is called the electricity consumption method. Then, the econometric 
model (equation 1) is applied to model 1, model II and model III. One of the main advantages 
of this method is that it does not only consider electricity consumption as an indicator but is 
also consider electricity production, energy consumption and energy production as indicators. 
 
Prior to estimating results, it is important to determine the lag order of endogenous and 
exogenous variables. For this purpose, given that the data is annual, the maximum lag is set to 
2 and AIC and SBC are used to ascertain the lag order of VARX. Both information criteria 
suggest a VARX of order 1. Subsequent to this, the null hypothesis of cointegration is tested 
using Johansen maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics. Cointegration test results are 
summarised in Table 6 for each model. The results reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
at a 5% level when using maximum eigenvalue statistics for each model. Similar results are 
obtained using trace statistics. As in the baseline models, cointegration test indicates the 
existence of one cointegrating vector, which implies a long-term relationship between the real 
GDP and the informal economy.  
 Table 6: Cointegration test (alternative models of a financial crisis)  
H0 H1 Test statistics    5%  
   cv 
10% 
cv  
                                                      Model I 
  
 
(I) Maximal eigenvalue statistics 
  
  
r=0 r=1 41.091 25.557 23.217  
r<=1 r=2 8.520 18.078 15.424 
(II) Trace statistics 
  
  
r=0 r=1 53.220 28.353 35.476  
r=1 r=2 12.130 21.988 19.467 
H0 H1 Test statistics 5%  
cv 
10% 
cv 
                                                                   Model II 
  
 
(I) Maximal eigenvalue statistics 
  
  
r=0 r=1 44.304 30.083 26.943  
r<=1 r=2 10.672 22.240 19.704 
(II) Trace statistics 
  
  
r=0 r=1 60.480 48.523 44.665  
r=1 r=2 16.177 29.354 25.806  
H0 H1 Test statistics 5% cv 10% 
cv  
                                                           Model III 
  
 
(I) Maximal eigenvalue statistics 
  
  
r=0 r=1 44.891 32.165 29.645  
r<=1 r=2 20.870 25.557 23.217 
(II) Trace statistics 
  
  
r=0 r=1 77.591 59.829 55.752  
r=1 r=2 32.701 38.353 35.476 
Source: Author. 
 
The results obtained are reported in Tables 7, 8 and 9 and the corresponding mean responses 
are shown in Figures 4, 5 and 6.  Estimations show that the aggregate financial crises (Model 
I) have a highly significant positive association with the informal economy (see Table 7 and 
Figure 4). Financial crises build up substantial positive responses from year 0 year 4 but do not 
add much to the positive effects on the informal economy, especially after year 6 and 
subsequent years after crises. However, the effect of financial crises on the informal economy 
is very strong (in size and in statistical significance). 
 
Turning now to the comparison of effects from a financial crisis for a baseline model and an 
alternative model, the results show that a financial crisis produces slightly larger responses 
within the informal economy using the alternative measurements. The cumulative positive 
response is about 82.9% for the alternative model, which is greater than the cumulative 
response for the baseline model at 73%. In addition, the immediate effect of financial crises is 
significant in the year of the crises. However, both the baseline model and the alternative model 
of a financial crisis show that the effect remains positive and significant in year 1 and thereafter 
for 10 years. 
 
 Table 7: Mean response of the informal economy to financial crises 
 (Alternative model) 
Years Financial crises  
Year 0 (instantaneous response)    0.023*** 
Year 1    0.052*** 
Year 2     0.068*** 
Year 3     0.077*** 
Year 4     0.082*** 
Year 5     0.085*** 
Year 6     0.087*** 
Year 7     0.088*** 
Year 8     0.089*** 
Year 9     0.089*** 
Year 10     0.089*** 
(i) Source: Author. (ii) Notes: (a) *** indicate 1% significance level respectively; (b) 1000 
replications were used in bootstrap confidence interval of impulse responses. 
 
Figure 4 Mean response of the informal economy to financial crises 
(Alternative model) 
 
(i) Source: Author. (ii) Note: the solid line represents the estimated IRF and dotted lines 
represent 95% confidence interval. 
With regard to internal and external crises, the mean responses are summarised in Table 8 and 
ensuing impulse response functions are portrayed in Figure 5. The results show that internal 
crises have an overall positive and significant effect on the informal economy (see Table 8, 
column (a) and Figure 5, graph (a)). More specifically, the mean response of the informal 
economy to internal crises is significantly positive at the 2.9% level in year 0, the effect stays 
highly significant in the following years and there is no sign of a decrease in positive responses 
over a 10-year period. This suggests that the effects of internal crises on the informal economy 
are permanent. Compared with the baseline model of an internal crisis, the mean response of 
the informal economy to an internal crisis was found to be significantly more positive using 
the alternative model for internal crises. This implies that the mean responses of the informal 
economy are larger in size using the alternative model of internal crises. Regarding the 
cumulative mean responses to an internal crisis of the alternative model, this amounted to 
 79.8%, which is substantially higher than that for the informal economy using the baseline 
model for an internal crisis (54.4%). 
 
Table 8: Mean response of the informal economy to internal and external crises    
(Alternative model) 
Years  Internal crises (a) External crises (b) 
Year 0 (instantaneous response)     0.029*** 0.003 
Year 1     0.052***    0.022** 
Year 2     0.064***     0.030*** 
Year 3     0.072***      0.036*** 
Year 4     0.077***      0.039*** 
Year 5     0.080***      0.042*** 
Year 6     0.083***      0.043*** 
Year 7     0.084***      0.044*** 
Year 8     0.085***      0.045*** 
Year 9     0.086***      0.045*** 
Year 10     0.086***      0.046*** 
(i)Source: Author. (ii) Notes: (a)* * and ***indicate 5% and 1% significance level of financial 
crisis shocks respectively; (b) 1000 replications were used in the bootstrap confidence interval 
of impulse responses. 
 
Figure 5: Mean response of the informal economy to internal and external crises 
(Alternative model) 
  
(i) Source: Author. (ii) Note: the solid line represents the estimated IRF and dotted lines 
represent 95% confidence interval. 
(a)                                                                          (b) 
 
 On the other hand, regarding the impact of an external crisis, as shown in Table 8, column (b) 
and Figure 5, graph (b), the positive effect is not statistically significant in year 0, but builds 
up to become statistically significant in terms of positive effects in year 1 and subsequent years. 
It seems that time is a crucial factor in the expansion of the effects of external crises on other 
countries. It should be noted that the results for the mean responses for the informal economy 
using the alternative model of an external crisis are weaker in terms of size than in the case of 
the baseline model. However, both baseline and alternative models of external crises indicate 
that there is no sign of a drop in the responses of the informal economy over a long-term 
horizon, indicating the persistent effects of external crises.  
 
Comparing an internal vs. external crisis using the alternative model, as can be seen from Table 
8 in the year of the crisis, the mean response of the informal economy is significantly more 
positive than the response to an external crisis. In fact, in year 0, an external crisis has no 
significant impact on the informal economy. In contrast to this, the effects of an internal crisis 
are more severe. For example, in year 1, an internal crisis would have had more than two times 
the impact on the informal economy than an external crisis. In the following years, an internal 
crisis would have almost twice the positive impact on the informal economy than external 
crises. 
 
Focusing on currency and banking crises, the estimated mean responses of the informal 
economy are presented in Table 9 and Figure 6. Currency crises, as shown in Table 9 column 
(a) and Figure 6, graph (a), tend to have a positive effect on the informal economy, but the 
effects are not statistically significant. The response of the informal economy is significantly 
positive in year 1 and remains positive and significant thereafter. Although mean responses 
remain consistently positive and significant in the following years, the positive effects of such 
‘twin’ crises do not fluctuate and do not build over time into substantial amounts. Using an 
alternative model of the currency crisis, the results show that these produce larger and induce 
stronger responses within the informal economy than the baseline model shows for currency 
crises. The cumulative effect of a currency crisis for the alternative model is about 63.9%, 
which is significantly higher than the cumulative effects of such crises on the baseline model 
(35.5%). 
 
A banking crisis seems to have a significant positive impact on the informal economy in the 
year of the crisis and in subsequent years. Specifically, in year 0, a banking crisis has more 
than twice the positive impact on the informal economy than a currency crisis. Although the 
immediate effect of a banking crisis is significantly more positive than for a currency crisis, 
the effect becomes weaker in size and statistical significance in year 1 and in the following 
years. Furthermore, the results show that the mean responses of the informal economy are not 
only weaker to banking crises in terms of size they are even weaker in terms of statistical 
significance using the alternative model of banking crises than a baseline model of banking 
crises. Thus, the cumulative impacts of a banking crisis are more positive using the baseline 
model (49.8%) than using the alternative model (34.7%). The cumulative effects in both cases, 
nonetheless, remain significantly positive. Overall, the effects of currency and banking crises 
are positive on the informal economy and in general are in line with our previous results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 9: Mean response of the informal economy to currency and banking crises 
(Alternative model) 
Years  Currency crises (a) Banking crises (b) 
Year 0 (instantaneous response)             0.007 0.016** 
Year 1 0.039*** 0.026** 
Year 2 0.054*** 0.030** 
Year 3 0.061*** 0.032** 
Year 4 0.065*** 0.034** 
Year 5 0.067*** 0.034** 
Year 6 0.068*** 0.035** 
Year 7 0.069*** 0.035** 
Year 8 0.069*** 0.035** 
Year 9 0.070*** 0.035** 
Year 10 0.070*** 0.035** 
(i) Source: Author. (ii) Note Notes: (a) ** and ***indicate 5% and 1% significance level of 
financial crisis shocks respectively (b) 1000 replications were used in the bootstrap 
confidence interval of impulse responses. 
 
Figure 6: Mean response of the informal economy to currency and banking crises 
(Alternative model) 
 
(i) Source: Author. (ii)   Note: the solid line represents the estimated IRF and dotted lines 
represent 95% confidence interval. 
(a)                                                                (b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
This paper attempted to analyse the path of the informal economy in times of crises. To do so, 
three VARX models for Turkey were estimated for the period 1980-2011. The first model was 
used to measure the aggregate impacts of financial crises on the informal economy. The second 
model explored the separate effects of internal and external financial crises, and the latter 
examined the effects of banking versus currency crises on the informal economy.  
 
Most of the studies in the literature tend to investigate the impact of the financial crises on the 
official economy, without considering differences across the official and the informal 
economy. Too little attention – only a few empirical studies (e.g. Colombo at al., 2012, 
Colombo et al., 2016) has been paid to examining the impact of the financial crises directly on 
the informal economy across the world. Roco et al., (2001) and Elgin, (2012) highlight the role 
of the informal economy as countercyclical in times of crises. Looking specifically at Turkey, 
there are no empirical studies exploring the impact of financial crises on the informal economy. 
On these grounds, the present paper fills this gap and contribute to the literature by providing 
an empirical investigation on the impact of financial crises on the informal economy in Turkey. 
Turkey is a particularly interesting case to investigate the relationship between the informal 
economy and financial crises, not least because it has a large informal economy, and since the 
1980s has seen widespread economic, political and institutional changes. Financial 
liberalisation had been expected to achieve stability, inspire business confidence to invest and 
produce stable growth with controlled inflation. However, having experienced a series of 
crises, Turkey has suffered from chronic unemployment problems, which again reinforces the 
importance of the informal economy – as it is to this that the unemployed turn, sometimes 
merely to live, but also to add to a limited income by those working within the state system and 
thus largely in the formal economy.   
 
The goal has been to verify the reliability of our results by exploring the effect of distinct types 
of crises on the informal economy. We provide evidence that each type of financial crises is 
positively associated with the informal economy and that the effect of each crisis was 
permanent, commonly lasting 10 years in Turkey. In an attempt to find the impact of distinct 
types of financial crises, the effect of aggregate financial crises is felt one year after the crises 
and the effect remains highly significant in subsequent years. With regard to internal crises 
versus external crises, the immediate effect of internal crises is positive and significant, unlike 
external crises where the positive and significant effect occurs with some delay. This implies 
that external crises take time, propagating in other countries through various transmission 
channels. Having considered the effects of currency and banking crises, they both have an 
overall positive impact on the informal economy. Therefore, our results are in line with the 
literature (Colombo et al. 2012, 2016), suggesting that the informal economy tends to act as a 
powerful buffer in times of financial crisis. The present findings also suggest a negative inter-
connection between the informal economy and the real GDP. 
 
The Turkish government must attune their understanding of the role of the informal economy 
as the main job provider for unemployed people, crucial for economic development and 
reducing unemployment and poverty. At the same time, key policy objectives from the 
perspective of development need to be considered in order to improve the employment 
opportunities, income, social security, quality of informal work and the outcome of individuals 
in the informal economy. This will contribute to social and individual welfare and encourage 
microfinance institutions, thus contributing to economic development. While efforts should be 
made to address negative aspects of the informal economy and support people in the informal 
 economy, it is important not to destroy its capacity to provide livelihoods and to develop output, 
employment and entrepreneurial potential. The potential of the informal economy cannot be 
overlooked in Turkey. In this case, Turkish-policy makers should consider equal opportunities 
for both informal and formal workers. Informal workers are often poor, less educated and low 
skilled individuals, and vocational training and education programs will improve their 
professional knowledge and skills.  
 
Although this paper is the first empirical study exploring the impact of financial crises on the 
informal economy in the Turkish context it would be interesting to assess the effects of 
financial crises on the informal economy in other countries and compare. A further study could 
also assess the effects of financial crises using a high frequency of data i.e. quarterly data to 
analyse the very immediate effects of crises. 
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 Appendix 
 
Table A1: Definition of financial crises by Reinhart and Rogoff 
Currency Crises 
 
Defined as annual depreciation of currency versus relevant 
anchor currency of 15 or more 
Banking Crises 
 
 
 
 
Defined as (I) bank runs that lead to closure, merging or takeover 
given by the public sector of one or more financial institutions. 
(II)if there are no bank runs, the closure merging and takeover or 
large scale of government assistance of important financial 
institutions that mark the start of a string of similar institutions. 
External debt crises The failure of the government to meet a principal or interest 
payments on the due date under the jurisdiction of foreign law 
Domestic debt crises The same definition applied above applied to domestic debt crises 
under the country's own law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure A1: Mean response of GDP 
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Figure A2: Mean response of GDP (alternative models of a financial crisis) 
 
 
The response of GDP to financial crises (f) 
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